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Abstract: 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ex-ante board connections and 
director retention result in agency costs to target company shareholders in the form of reduced 
payment in mergers and acquisitions transaction. 
Design/methodology/approach – We employ detailed data of ex-ante board connection and 
director retention in the mergers and acquisition in the UK from 1999-2015. Ex-ante board 
connections are measured as proportion of target & acquirer companies’ directors worked on 
the same board at any time prior to the takeover, while director retention is measured as 
proportion of target companies’ directors remains on board after the takeover is completed. For 
mergers and acquisition payment characteristics, we examine takeover premium, cash payment 
percentage and offer price adjustment.  
Findings – We find that ex-ante board connections and director retention lead to reduced offer 
prices and lower proportions of cash payment. Notably, when there is no connection and target 
directors are not retained, we find that the bidding companies increase their final offer by £14m 
more than in other scenarios. We also document strong evidence that ex-ante board connections 
lead to a higher probability of director retention. 
Originality/value – Our paper highlights that ex-ante board connections and director 
retention will lead to a significant cost on target company shareholders. We recommend that 
a more detailed set of information on ex-ante board connections and intended target board 
retention should be disclosed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Directors of target companies are subject to a conflict of interest arising from ex-ante 
connections to the bidder (Wulf, 2004; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Qiu et al., 
2014; Guo et al., 2015; Schmidt, 2015). This conflict of interest may result in agency costs to 
the detriment of target company shareholders. During the takeover process, target directors 
may pursue personal benefits rather than target shareholder wealth in the takeover process (Ishii 
and Xuan, 2014; Qiu et al., 2014). Target directors may be concerned to ensure they are retained 
after the takeover whilst bidders may seek to exploit personal connections to gain favourable 
acquisition terms (Qiu et al., 2014).i In both cases, target company shareholders are vulnerable 
to reduced takeover terms compared to arm’s length contracting. Any loss of value to the target 
company shareholders which arises solely due to the actions of their directors can be interpreted 
as a form of agency cost. The purpose of our paper is to examine the agency costs arising from 
ex-ante board connections and target director retention. Our empirical approach is to examine 
the impact of board connection and retention variables on the price paid by the bidder in 
takeovers. In particular, we examine the impact of a range of board connection and retention 
variables on the payment characteristics in UK mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
Target directors have a pecuniary incentive to ‘cooperate’ with the bidder if they may be 
retained and this incentive may result in a specific agency cost - reduced terms for target 
company shareholders in the takeover process. A completed takeover may result in the 
departure of target directors, causing a significant loss to the target director both financially 
and in terms of their personal investment in human capital. Considering the potential negative 
consequences for target directors, target directors may bargain vigorously for personal interests 
during takeover negotiation. An example from our sample is provided by Dixons acquisition 
of Carphone Warehouse in 2014. Carphone Warehouse CEO Andrew Harrison was retained as 
deputy CEO in the combined company. His annual cash compensation (salary plus bonus) 
increased from £656,000 (when he was with Carphone Warehouse in 2013) to £1,315,000 
(when he was with the acquirer in 2015).  
Since ex-ante connections provide a channel for negotiation between bidders and targets, board 
connections and retention of target directors may have positive effects on shareholder wealth 
for either or both parties. Recent research indicates that the probability of being retained 
increases if directors have an ex-ante connection to the board of the bidding company 
(Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Ishii and Xuan, 2014).  Directors may be retained in order to 
preserve value associated with their knowledge and experience of the target. Such information 
would be expected to enhance shareholder value for bidder shareholders after the takeover 
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particularly if information asymmetry regarding target activities is reduced. Equally, such 
information may allow the bidder to justify a higher valuation of the target which would benefit 
the target company shareholders in particular.  
In addition, M&A are a principal form of protection for minority shareholders in the UK and 
elsewhere. That protection is compromised if board members do not negotiate in the interests 
of the target shareholders in the takeover process. The incentive to negotiate may be lessened 
if the target directors have ex-ante connections to the bidder and this is particularly true if they 
are then retained after the takeover. In an extreme example, a target director may be able to 
convert a hostile takeover into a friendly one. The lost value for the target shareholders can be 
interpreted as a form of agency cost. 
Previous studies have examined the role of connections between targets and bidders’ CEOs in 
U.S. M&A. In the US, decision-making lies more formally with the CEO. According to the 
Spencer Stuart U.S Board Index® 2013, 55% of CEOs are also the chairman of their U.S 
companies. In the UK, the role of non-executive directors is emphasised, and CEOs are less 
central to decision-making. For instance, CEO duality is rare in the UK, and UK CEOs are paid 
far less compared with their US counterparts (Murphy, 2013). There are also important 
differences between the U.S. and U.K. takeover regimes. In the U.S., state laws, corporate 
bylaws and anti-takeover provisions protect CEOs from dismissal and allow managerial 
entrenchment (e.g. Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Bebchuk et al., 2009). Takeover defences, 
disallowed in the UK, are used to protect the CEO and their board from takeovers. US non-
executive directors are less central to decision-making and are often accused of lacking 
independence (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). This emphasis on independence in UK boards 
may have a negative effect on target shareholder wealth in the takeover process. Whilst internal 
independence between the insiders and outsiders on a board is clearly desirable, there has been 
little consideration of the role of external independence such as connections to other, perhaps 
competing, firms. Bidders may be able to exploit any external lack of independence in the form 
of board connections. This motivates our interest in the impact of not only connections between 
CEOs but with other members of the board as well.  
In short, board connections and the possibility of retention may make target firm directors 
better motivated to accept deals. Target firm directors may take advantage of their position for 
personal benefit at the cost of target firm shareholders. Such behaviour may be considered both 
unethical and manifest in lower takeover premiums and lower levels of cash payment. 
Ultimately, board connections give rise to a conflict of interest between target directors’ 
fiduciary duty to shareholders and their personal benefits from retention. This phenomenon can 
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be observed by examining the impact of board connections and retention on payment 
characteristics in M&A. 
Our framework considers that board connections and director retention can be exploited to the 
detriment of target shareholder wealth. Initially, we examine how payment characteristics are 
influenced by board connections and director retention. We then examine four scenarios which 
indicate the joint effect of our explanatory variables on payment characteristics. These are (1) 
there is an ex-ante connection between members of the board of the target and the bidder, and 
at least one target director is retained after the takeover; (2) there is an ex-ante connection and 
no retention of target directors; (3) no ex-ante connection between the bidder and the target 
boards but at least one member of the target board is retained; (4) no ex-ante connection and 
no directors of the target are retained. Each of these scenarios has different implications for the 
bargaining between bidders and targets. Here, we are concerned to examine whether target 
company shareholders are protected from agency costs when connections and/or retention are 
present. We complete our primary analysis with a test of the probability that ex-ante 
connections will result in retention.  
To test our view, we collect a sample of UK mergers and acquisitions for the period 1999 to 
2015. We consider board connections and retention both at board level (such as the proportion 
of directors retained) and individual level (such as specific connections between target and 
bidder CEOs). The transaction characteristics we are interested in are the takeover premium, 
the final bid adjustment and the percentage of the bid which is in cash. Offer price adjustments 
by bidding firms are rarely examined in the literature and are a useful proxy for bargain power 
and incentives during negotiation process.  
Our main findings are as follows. We find that if there is an ex-ante board connection or a 
target director is retained then the percentage change in final offer prices is lower compared to 
the initial offer price. We also identify that proportions of bids paid in cash are lower when a 
board connection is observed, or a director is retained. With respect to retention, we find that 
target directors are more likely to remain on the combined board if they have an ex-ante 
connection with the board of the bidding firm. Finally, the results of tests of the preferred 
scenario for target shareholders indicate that final offer prices and the percentage of the bid 
paid in cash are higher when there is no connection and directors are not retained. Taken 
together our findings indicate an agency cost to target company shareholders when target 
directors have an ex-ante board connection or target directors are retained. Our findings also 
echo the growing literature of directors’ opportunistic behaviours in merger and acquisition 
(e.g. Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015) and the impact of directors’ connections on firm 
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value (e.g. Kim, 2005; Hsu and Wu, 2014). We discuss the implications of these findings in 
later sections.   
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the impact of two distinctive 
board relations during merger and acquisition: ex-ante board connections when takeover is 
announced and target director retention when the takeover is completed. The most similar study 
in a UK context is conducted by Renneboog and Zhao (2014) who examine directors’ networks 
in the takeover process and find that better connected target and bidder boards affect the 
characteristics of takeover deals. Deals are more likely to be completed and negotiations are 
shorter. We broaden their study by examining specific details of payment characteristics and a 
wider set of connection and retention variables. Secondly, we also extend the literature by 
examining the joint effect of board connections and director retention through the lens of 
agency theory and investor protection. Thirdly, we extend Qiu et al. (2014)’s study of CEO 
retention to retention of all target directors. In addition, our paper provides new evidence of 
mergers and acquisition motivation driven by director retention. Prior literature addresses 
incentives for mergers and acquisition from controlling shareholders (e.g. Thraya, 2015) and 
managerial overconfidence (e.g. Pan et al., 2006). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the extant literature 
and then we present our hypotheses in the third section. We explain the research methods 
employed in the fourth section and then proceed to describe the sources of our data. We present 
our main findings and robustness checks in the sixth section. We then provide a discussion of 
the empirical results and the implications for takeover regulation. The final section is a 
conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Board connections in M&A 
Directors’ networks within boards (e.g. Subrahmanyam, 2008; Hoitash, 2011) and outside the 
corporation (e.g. Bona-Sánchez et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2016) have drawn attention from 
researchers. In particular, there is a growing literature investigating board connections and 
corporate financial decisions (e.g. Bizjak et al., 2006; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Renneboog and 
Zhao, 2014). Directors’ networks have been shown to be relevant to company value and 
decision-making in a number of studies. Ishii and Xuan (2014) study social ties between 
directors of bidder and target firms. They show that cross-firm social connections between 
bidder and target firm directors have a significant negative effect on abnormal returns to the 
acquirer firm. In their view social ties between bidder and target firm directors lead to poor 
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merger and acquisition decisions. By looking at target directors’ networks, Stuart and Yim 
(2010) find that listed firms are more likely to become targets if their directors have previous 
private equity deal experience. Huang et al. (2014) examine acquiring directors’ networks and 
document that acquirer firm directors with investment bank experience are more likely to make 
better deals, in terms of paying lower takeover premiums, advisory fees and enjoying superior 
long-run performance. Examining the board connections within board, Schmidt (2015) finds 
that friendship or close relations among bidding firm directors may not be in the interests of 
bidding firm shareholders.  
Another subset of literature examines bidder and target firm board connections directly. By 
employing a large sample of US data from 1996-2008, Cai and Sevilir (2012) document that 
connections between bidder and target boards in the takeover process result in lower takeover 
premiums and higher cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter CAR) for bidder firms. Guo et al. 
(2015) also employ US data and document that target firms will have a lower CAR, if the target 
and bidder have ex-ante board connections. Their findings also indicate that connected merger 
and acquisition deals result in lower takeover premium payments. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) 
explore board connections in merger and acquisitions by using UK data from 1995-2012. In 
their study connected boards increase the likelihood of deal completion and shorten the time 
required to reach agreement. They also note that the cash portion of overall payments is lower 
if boards are connected. However, their evidence suggests that markets do not recognise ex-
ante board connections since abnormal returns at announcement are similar for boards with no 
connections.  
There are several reasons why board connections may affect pay characteristics in M&A. First, 
a board connection may lead to an improved channel of communication during the bid (Cai 
and Sevilir, 2012). Bidding firms which have an ex-ante board connection with target firms 
may be more likely to engage in regular communication and in a friendly manner. Empirical 
evidence indicates that friendly takeovers often have lower premiums and lower short-term 
wealth effects for target firms, thus benefiting bidding company shareholders (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Secondly, board connections may also lead to reduced information 
asymmetry between target and bidding firms. 
The role of information asymmetry in M&A is highlighted by Croci et al. (2012), who argue 
that acquiring company managers may offer a higher premium for the target if they possess 
favourable information. Bidding for the wrong target due to information asymmetry is one of 
the main causes of value-destroying M&A deals (Beitel et al., 2004) whilst bidding firms with 
a board connection (i.e. directors of the acquirer serving on the board of the target firm) are 
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more likely to have good information about the target firm. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) argue 
that board connections may resolve information asymmetry between the bidder and the target 
allowing acquirers to successfully complete deals in good time. On the other hand, the acquirer 
firm may be able to take advantage of information from target board members to improve the 
terms of the deal (i.e. to lower the takeover premium and level of cash payment). Reduced 
takeover premiums are bad news for target shareholders. In summary, there are two main 
strands of arguments identified in the preceding literature on board connections: 1) board 
connections improve communication channels between bidder and target boards; and 2) board 
connections reduce the information asymmetry between target and acquirer firms. 
 
2.2 Board retention in M&A 
There is also a growing literature on target directors’ next position following the completed 
deal. Studies document that target directors (including CEOs) may experience negative 
outcomes after the takeover is completed. According to Agrawal and Walking (1994), target 
directors find it difficult to land another directorship. Due to the negative consequences for 
target firm directors if the deal is completed (i.e. being unemployed), a literature has developed 
which examines retention of target directors. Agency theory provides a useful framework to 
study the effect of board connections in M&A. From an agency perspective, target CEOs may 
bargain for private benefits at a cost to target shareholders during M&A (e.g. Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003). In an early paper, Wulf (2004) identifies that target CEOs will accept a lower 
takeover premium if offered an important role in the combined firm. However, this early study 
is constrained by a small and highly specific sample (40 observations for US “mergers of equals” 
deal form 1991-1999). More recently, Qiu et al. (2014) collect a large US data from 1994 to 
2010. They find that takeover premiums are negatively related to target CEO retention. 
Furthermore, target CEO retention in a senior role in the combined firm, including CEO, CFO 
or COO, is associated with an even lower takeover premium compared with other retained 
board positions (e.g. non-executive director). Target firm stock return at announcement is also 
lower if target CEOs are retained. Qui et al. (2014) conclude that results from their analysis 
strongly support the conflict of interest hypothesis indicating that target CEOs bargain 
vigorously for private benefits during the takeover process. 
However, not all evidence supports the argument that target directors trade takeover premium 
for retention. Bargeron et al. (2010) use US data from 1994-2006 and find that CEO retention 
is not associated with a lower takeover premium. They find that a target CEO is more likely to 
stay if he or she has skills and knowledge that bidder executives do not have. Acquirers are 
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also found to be willing to pay a higher premium for target firms if the target CEO is retained 
in a sample of private equity acquisitions (Bargeron et al., 2017). 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Takeover premium 
Our first hypothesis looks at the most explicit takeover characteristic, the takeover premium. It 
captures the difference between the offer price and the market price of target firm. With respect 
to board connections, we argue that ex-ante connections will favour the bidder and result in 
costs to the target company shareholders. One explanation is that a target director has an 
incentive to bargain less vigorously if they have a connection to the bidding firm. From the 
perspective of a target company shareholder this means reduced protection from ex-ante 
agency costs. An alternative explanation is that ex-ante board connections will reduce 
information asymmetry between acquirer firm board and target firm (e.g. Renneboog and Zhao, 
2014). Ex-ante board connections will make bidder firm directors better-informed about the 
target firm which will reduce the incidence and risk of overpayment. Hence, bidder firms are 
likely to pay less for the target. If ex-ante connections with the target give bidders an advantage 
in terms of information asymmetry, it is likely to manifest itself in the payment characteristics. 
Specifically, bidders with ex-ante connections will pay lower takeover premiums. 
As far as the target director retention is concerned, we argue that target directors may trade (or 
hope to trade) takeover premium for retention. Again, target firm directors may bargain less 
vigorously if they may be retained. Hence, bidders are more likely to pay less in terms of 
takeover premiums. Such a prediction is also supported by some US literature (e.g. Wulf, 2004; 
Qiu et al., 2014).  In summary, our first hypothesis is listed below.  
Hypothesis 1. Ex-ante board connections (director retention) will result in a lower takeover 
premium. 
 
3.2 Offer price adjustment 
Our second hypothesis is related with a pay characteristic which has received relatively little 
consideration, the offer price adjustment i.e. the adjustment to the offer after the initial bid. 
During the price negotiation period, bidders may review their initial offer price due, for 
example, to bargaining with the target (Deloitte, 2016). Therefore, we argue that the offer price 
adjustment is a reasonable proxy for the bargain outcome from target directors. A large 
adjustment to the initial offer price may indicate that target directors negotiate more 
aggressively on behalf of the target shareholders. Boards with ex-ante connections to the bidder, 
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on the other hand, may not do as good a job of negotiating the price during the merger process. 
Therefore, we predict that the change in the final offer will be lower if target directors have ex-
ante connections to the bidder. Considering that target directors may bargain for retention, they 
are more likely to approve a deal with little or no change to the initial bid, benefiting bidders’ 
shareholders and at a cost to target shareholders. Hence, we predict that that the offer price 
adjustment is lower if target directors are retained. In short, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. Ex-ante board connections (director retention) will result in a lower adjustment 
to the initial offer price. 
 
3.3 Cash payment 
Our third hypothesis is about the payment method in mergers and acquisitions. The payment 
method can have significant impact on both of target and acquirer shareholders’ wealth. In an 
early paper, Huang and Walkling (1987) document that target shareholders gain higher 
abnormal returns around the takeover announcement if bidder pays in cash rather than with 
stock. This may be explained by agency costs. Acquirer firm directors may have incentives to 
use excess cash to empire build in acquisitions, indicating overpayment for the target firms. 
From the point view of acquirer shareholders, Linn and Switzer (2001) find that acquirer firm 
shareholders benefit more when payment is made in cash. Cash payment avoids the partial 
dilution of voting rights for existing shareholders of the bidder. 
Another explanation for the choice between cash and stock in M&A is the valuation of bidder 
stock. Bidders will prefer to use stock when their own stock is overvalued. For instance, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a theory that the choice of the medium of payment is linked 
with bidder’s stock valuation. Payments are made disproportionately in stock when valuations 
for bidders are high, and in cash when they are low. Examining the bidder’s familiarity with 
target, Eckbo et al. (1990) provide evidence that the mix of cash and stock pay is a function of 
information asymmetry between target and bidders. Acquirers also prefer to make offers in 
stock when the bidder’s stock value is difficult to estimate with accuracy (Wu, 2011). Similarly, 
Martin (1996) documents that bidders are more likely to offer cash over stock if the value of 
the target firm is uncertain. We argue that ex-ante board connections may motivate a stock 
rather than cash offer. If ex-ante board connections make bidders better informed about the 
target firm, the need to use cash to reduce uncertainty is reduced. Therefore, ex-ante board 
connections may lead to lower levels of cash payment. 
Board retention may also affect the pay method. Firstly, target firm directors may bargain for 
retention and accept a deal in favour of bidders’ shareholders. A lower level of cash payment 
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may be beneficial for bidders’ shareholders, especially when their equity value is uncertain, 
difficult to assess or overvalued by the market. If target directors bargain to stay on the board 
of the merged company, they may be willing to accept bids with smaller proportions paid in 
cash to the benefit of bidding company shareholders and at a cost to target shareholders. 
Secondly, bidder firms are more likely to offer stock rather than cash if they agree to terms 
which include retention of target directors. Agency theory suggests that managerial ownership 
is likely to link the interests of shareholders to that of managers. By offering stock payment, 
target directors’ ownership in the target firm will convert into ownership in the bidder. Hence 
stock payment aligns the interests of retained target firm directors with those of bidders’ 
shareholders, rather than those of target firm shareholders. Hence, we predict that board 
retention will result in a lower level of cash payment. The preceding discussion leads us to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Ex-ante board connections (director retention) will result in a lower proportion 
of bid payment in cash. 
 
3.4 Joint effect of ex-ante board connections and director retention 
Previous literature seeks to address the impact of board connections and retention on mergers 
and acquisitions separately (e.g. Qiu et al., 2014; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014). The joint effect 
of ex-ante board connection and retention remains unknown. In our fourth hypothesis we seek 
to shed light on the impact of combinations of ex-ante board connections and retention. The 
four possible scenarios are as follows: (1) there is an ex-ante connection between members of 
the board of the target and the bidder, and at least one target director is retained after the 
takeover; (2) there is an ex-ante connection and no retention of target directors; (3) no ex-ante 
connection between the bidder and the target boards but at least one member of the target board 
is retained; (4) no ex-ante connection and no directors of the target are retained. The purpose 
of our scenario analysis based on connection and retention are twofold. First, to get an overall 
picture of connections and retention, we examine the combined effect of board connections 
and retention on pay characteristics. Second, we seek to identify a scenario which protects the 
interests of target shareholders. 
In our previous discussion we argue that both ex-ante connections and director retention will 
favour the acquirer firm (but not necessarily their shareholders) at the cost of target 
shareholders. Ex-ante board connections may provide the acquiring board with an information 
advantage over the target firm, while board retention may motivate target directors to pursuit 
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personal benefits. Therefore, our expectation is that target shareholders benefit most in the 
scenario which is free of ex-ante board connections and target directors are not retained. 
Hypothesis 4. Payment characteristics (takeover premium, offer price adjustment, cash 
percentage) will be highest when there are no ex-ante board connections and target directors 
are not retained. 
 
3.5 Board connections and probability of retention 
Finally, we examine the link between board connections and the probability of retention. If 
board connections reduce information asymmetry between target and acquirer directors, the 
connected target directors may have a better chance of being retained. Two previous studies 
have provided evidence on this hypothesis. Ishii and Xuan (2014) find that social ties between 
target and bidder firm directors will lead to a higher probability of retention whilst Renneboog 
and Zhao (2014) document that the proportion of target directors retained is positively related 
to board connections. Rather than examining social ties between board members or the 
proportion of target directors retained, our hypothesis adds to the existing evidence by directly 
examining whether an ex-ante board connections influence retention of any target directors. 
Thus, we formulate our final hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 5. The probability of board retention is higher when there is an ex-ante board 
connection.  
 
4. RESEARCH METHOD 
To test our first three hypotheses, we use the regression model in equations (1): 
 
Yi,t  = ß0 + ß1 ex-ante Board connectionsi,t  (Director retentioni,t) + ∑ ß2 Controlsi,t + ∑ ß3 Industry + ∑ 
ß4 Year + εi,t                                                                                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
For equation (1), we use three dependent variables (Y), namely the takeover premium, the 
adjustment to the initial offer during the bidding process (offer price adjustment) and the 
proportion of the payment which is paid in cash (cash percentage). We include four explanatory 
variables relating to ex-ante board connections and four explanatory variables relating to 
retention of directors of the target firm.  
Our board connection variables are ex-ante board connection, target and bidder CEO ex-ante 
connection, shared directors and proportion of shared directors. Connections come in various 
forms. For example, Peter Hambro Mining PLC announced a bid for Aricom PLC in 2009. 
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Peter Hambro, the executive chairman of the bidder, was also the deputy chairman (NED) of 
the target firm when the bid was announced. We classify this case as an ex-ante board 
connection, since bidder and target firm have a shared director. Another example is provided 
by Datamonitor PLC, who announced a bid for Ovum PLC in 2006. The bidder CEO, Michael 
Danson, and target CEO, Christopher Dines, were fellow directors in another company 
Techmark Research Ltd in the years before the bid. We also classify this case as an ex-ante 
board, since target and bidder CEOs have a direct ex-ante connection. 
Our target board retention variables are target director retention, target CEO retention, the 
number of target directors retained, and the proportion of target directors retained. For instance, 
Rowe Evans Investment PLC announced a takeover of Lendu holding PLC in 2004. After the 
deal was completed in 2005, all four target firm directors remained on the combined board. We 
define this case as a case of target director retention and the proportion of target directors 
retained is 100%.  
Our control variables for equation (1) includes other takeover characteristics (friendly, tender 
offer and same industry) and firm characteristics variables (size, leverage, profitability and 
market to book ratio). A dummy variable is included for the calendar year of the announcement 
in addition to dummy variables representing the Fama-French 12 industry classification for the 
acquirer.  
To test our fourth hypothesis, we create four dummy variables as follows: (1) no connection 
and no retention; (2) no connection but director retention; (3) connected and no retention; and 
(4) connected and director retention. Each variable indicates a combined effect relating to ex-
ante board connections and retention. The model is similar with equation (1).  
To test our fifth hypothesis, that board connections affect the probability of retention, we use 
the equation (2): 
 
Prob (Director retentioni,t )  = ß0 + ß1 ex-ante Board connectionsi,t + ∑ ß2 Controlsi,t + ∑ ß3 Industry + ∑ 
ß4 Year + εi,t                                                                                                                           (2) 
                                                                                                                                     
For equation (2) we use two dependent variables indicating the probability of board retention. 
Target director retention indicates whether any director is retained by the acquirer whilst target 
CEO retention indicates whether the CEO of the target is retained on the bidder’s board in any 
capacity. The explanatory variables for the probit analysis include variables representing ex-
ante board connections between the bidder and the target, and target CEOs’ ex-ante 
connections to the CEO of the bidder. Besides control variables used in equation (1), we also 
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add several corporate governance variables (bidder CEO duality, bidder board independence 
ratio, bidder and target CEO equity incentives and target CEO age) in equation (2). All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5. DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
The data for this study was collected from three data sources. Data for merger and acquisition 
transactions was collected from the Securities Data Company (SDC) using Thomson One 
Banker. Information on ex-ante board connections and target director retention was collected 
from BoardEx. The data for firm characteristics is collected from Thomson DataStream. 
Our sample includes all completed merger and acquisition deals announced from the start of 
1999 to the end of August in 2015. All acquirer and target firms are UK public listed firms. We 
exclude transactions in which the deal value is less than £1million. We also restrict the sample 
to those deals in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the target shares prior to the 
acquisition announcement and owned 100% of the target shares after the deal is completed. For 
ex-ante board connections and retention data, we restrict the sample to those companies for 
which directors’ information is fully available in BoardEx for both target and bidder firms.ii  
After employing the preceding filters, the final sample comprises of 209 observations. The 
sample size reflects the incomplete nature of information available regarding board connections 
and retention, especially for smaller target firms. For example, we require all target firm 
directors’ post M&A job information (firm name, post title, start date and tenure). Such 
information is not available for a number of small firms in the sample. 
The sample descriptive statistics are listed in Table 2. For board connection variables, an ex-
ante board connection when takeover is announced is observed in 15% of sample acquisitions 
which is a similar proportion to Renneboog and Zhao (2014), whose sample identified 11% of 
cases with an ex-ante connection. At the time of the takeover, connections between CEOs of 
both target and acquirer firms are identified in 9% of the sample. A further 10% of cases have 
at least one director serving on both the boards of the target and acquirer firms (Shared directors) 
when the takeover is announced. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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For board retention variables, one third (34%) of bidding firms in the sample retain at least one 
director after completion of the takeover. Nearly a quarter of target CEOs (23%) in the sample 
are retained in some capacity by the bidder including some who become CEO of the combined 
firm. Our sample is comparable to Qiu et al. (2014) who document a retention rate for US 
target CEOs of 31% (688 out of 2198 cases). On average, acquirer firms pay a 4-week premium 
of 31.80% for target firms and bid adjustments range from -2.16% to 25.20%. The mean and 
median percentages of the bid paid in cash are 48.48% and 48.62%. 
In Table 3, we show the change of retained target CEO pay before and after takeover is 
completed. Among our cases of retained target CEOs, the average pay before and after takeover 
are £ 167,000 and £545,000 respectively. Retention is an attractive deal for target firm directors. 
Both salary and variable pay (bonus and equity grant) increase significantly if the target CEO 
remains on board. Increased pay creates a strong incentive for target directors to bargain for 
retention, even at the cost of target firm shareholders.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
6. MAIN RESULTS 
6.1 Board connections, director retention and takeover characteristics 
We present the relationship between board connections, retention and takeover characteristics 
in Tables 4-6. For each table, we present the results for models of board connections in Panel 
A whilst director retention is examined in Panel B.iii Dependent variables are the takeover 
premium, offer price adjustment and cash percentage. Independent variables in Panel A are 
board connection variables, while those in Panel B are board retention variables.  
The evidence from Table 4 indicates that takeover premiums are not related with either board 
connection or board retention variables.iv Such results do not support our hypotheses 1.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The adjustment to the initial bid during the bidding process receives limited attention in the 
literature but is informative since it captures negotiating power between bidder and target firms. 
In Table 5, we find that the offer price adjustments are negatively related to both board 
connections and retention variables. For example, in model (4) of Panel A, offer price 
adjustments are 1.2% lower if CEOs have an ex-ante connection which is significant at the 5% 
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level. This result provides support for our hypotheses 2 that the difference between the initial 
and final bids will be lower if they have a board connection or target directors are retained.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Our hypotheses 3 tests whether acquirers will pay a lower percentage of the deal value in cash 
if they have a board connection or target directors are retained. Table 6 shows that the 
percentage paid in cash is negatively related with both board connection and retention variables. 
For example, in model (2) of Panel B indicates that the percentage of cash payment will be 
17.2% lower if the target has at least one director retained by the bidder.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Our next step is the scenario analysis in hypothesis 4. In Table 7, we show that the scenario of 
not connected and not retained provides the best deal for target shareholders. For instance, the 
coefficients for connected and retained, connected and not retained, and not connected and 
retained in model (3) are -30.03, -17.57 and -16.69 respectively. Each of these coefficients is 
significant. Only the scenario of not connected and not retained results in higher cash payment. 
The other three scenarios result in lower pay in cash in our models. In an unreported model of 
the offer price adjustment, in which we use not connected and not retained as the sole 
categorical variable, we find a coefficient of 1.47 (which is significant at the 5% level). This 
suggests that the final offer price will be 1.47% higher than the initial offer price if there is no 
ex-ante connection and no target directors are retained. Such a result has strong economic 
significance as well. Considering the average offer price for target firm in our sample is £956 
million (£725m×1.32%), the target firm shareholder will gain £14 million from the final offer 
(£956m×1.47%), if their directors have no ex-ante connection with the bidder and no director 
of the target remains on the merged board after takeover. In short, our scenario analysis 
indicates that target shareholders may benefit most in the scenario of not connected ant not 
retained.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
6.2 Board connections and the probability of retention 
Finally, we explore the link between ex-ante board connections and the probability of retention. 
The question here is whether ex-ante board connections result in a higher probability of director 
retention. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) report that an ex-ante connected board will lead to more 
target firm directors joining the combined firm’s board after M&A is completed. We extend 
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their findings in three ways. Firstly, we examine the relationship between the probability of 
retention of any members of the target board and their ex-ante board connections. Secondly, 
we look at the probability of target CEO retention and connections between CEOs of the target 
and bidder firms. Thirdly, we examine whether the relation between connection and retention 
is linear. Our results are shown in Tables 8 & 9.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The dependent variables in Table 8 are retention of any target director (models 1-2), non-CEO 
retention only (models 3-4) and target CEO retention (models 5-7). The independent variables 
are ex-ante board connections (models 1-4) and target and acquirer CEOs ex-ante connections 
(models 5-7). We also include a set of corporate governance variables (e.g. acquirer board 
independence ratio, target and acquirer CEO equity incentives) in regressions models. 
We find some strong evidence to support our hypothesis 5. Our results indicate that ex-ante 
board connections increase the probability of any target director being retained by the acquirer 
(models 1-2). However, such a relation is largely driven by CEO retention, because non-CEO 
retention only is not significant (models 3-4). In addition, ex-ante board connections between 
target and acquirer CEOs also increases the likelihood of target CEO retention at the 5% level 
in models 5 to 7.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In Table 9, we use the proportion of the target board retained as the dependent variable, and 
the proportion of shared directors and number of connections as independent variables. We do 
not find that an increase in the proportion of shared directors or number of connections will 
result in an increase in the proportion of target directors retained. In short, we conclude that the 
board connections will increase the likelihood of director retention (Table 8), but such a relation 
between connection and retention is not linear (Table 9).  
 
6.3 Robustness check 
Previous authors, such as Cai and Sevilir (2012) and Qiu et al (2014), have highlighted the 
potential for endogeneity in CEO retention and takeover premium tests. v  We follow the 
approach by Qiu et al. (2014) by using a battery of M&A and board connection and retention 
variables to reduce the potential for omitted variable bias. They also confirm their results using 
the Heckman two-stage correction and we follow a Heckman procedure to examine sample 
selection bias in our data. Finally, Qiu et al. (2014) note that their tests do not perfectly deal 
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with endogeneity. We argue that since board connections are ex ante, they can reasonably be 
assumed to be independent of payment characteristics given the lost standing relationships 
involved. Thus, payment characteristics do not lead to the connections in our study. The 
concern then would be role of director retention. We argue that this is also independent of 
payment characteristics. Payment characteristics – takeover premium, cash payment and offer 
price changes – could perhaps be argued to encourage the company to retain board members 
but that implies a rather simplistic view of the M&A process and any influence on a general 
model is likely to be small. Instead, a more plausible explanation is the one proposed in this 
study, which is consistent with the explanation in Renneboog and Zhao (2014).  
Heckman (1979) addresses estimation bias that results from the use of non-randomly selected 
samples. In our study, it is possible that the sample is not randomly selected. More specifically, 
acquirers may be more likely to approach the target for a deal if they have ex-ante board 
connection. Therefore, our sample of connected and unconnected boards may be not randomly 
drawn from the general population of merger and acquisition cases. To address such a concern, 
we follow Qiu et al. (2014) and Schmidt (2015) to employ Heckman (1979) two-stage 
procedure. In the first stage, we use a probit model to structure the selection equations of 
acquirer and target CEOs’ ex-ante board connections, as a function of control variables used in 
tables 4 to 6 plus an additional instrumental variable: same city. The instrument equals one if 
the headquarters of acquirer and target firms are located in the same city and zero otherwise. 
The variable of same city may be a good instrument. Chakrabarti and Mitchell (2013) argue 
that the distance between acquirer and target will increase the search cost. They find that a firm 
is more likely to become the target, if it is geographically close to the acquirer. Similarly, 
Schildt and Laamanen (2006) document that geographic proximity (co-location) will increase 
the likelihood of mergers or acquisition. Neither of these papers document that the payment 
characteristics vary with distance between the bidder and the target.  
In the second stage, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio using the fitted value from the first 
stage model, and then add it as an additional control variable in equation (1). Such an inverse 
Mills ratio is expected to capture the sample selection effect for a given observation. If sample 
selection bias does not affect the relation between pay characteristics and ex-ante board 
connections, then Lambda, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage model 
will be statistically insignificant.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
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Column (1) of Table 10 shows the first stage of Heckman (1979) two stages procedure, a probit 
model where dependent variable is acquirer and target CEOs ex-ante board connections. Our 
instrumental variable is positive and significant at 1% level. It suggests that acquirer and target 
CEOs are more likely to have ex-ante board connection if they are headquartered in the same 
city. Columns (2) and (3) present the second stage of Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, 
where dependent variables are offer price adjustment and cash percentage respectively. Those 
results are consistent with our findings in Tables 6 and 7. Both offer price adjustment and cash 
percentage are negatively related with acquirer and target CEOs ex-ante connections. More 
importantly, Lambda, the coefficient of inverse Mills ratio calculated from column (1) is not 
statistically significant, either in column (2) or (3). The implication is that the relation between 
ex-ante board connections and pay characteristics is unlikely to be driven by sample selection 
bias.vi 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
Previous studies suggest that board connections may lead to a better deal for acquirer firm, in 
terms of the takeover premiums and short-term wealth effects after announcement (e.g. Cai and 
Sevilir, 2012). Such an effect may be due to the improved communication channel and 
reduction in information asymmetry between target and acquirer firms. Qiu et al. (2014) find 
that another type of board relation, retention of target CEOs on the combined board, will lead 
to a more favourable deal for acquirer firm. Since target CEOs may bargain for private benefits 
(e.g. retention on the board after the takeover) at the cost of target shareholders (e.g. lower 
premium). We extend these results by examining more detailed data on board connections and 
director retention than previous studies. Since Cadbury Report (1992), the UK has had a 
different approach to governance to other market-based economies. CEOs who chair the board 
are almost extinct and thus have less direct power over the decisions of the firm. The most 
similar paper in a UK context is provided by Renneboog and Zhao (2014), who focus more 
broadly on takeover success and director networks, include only limited evidence on the 
proportion of target directors retained. 
Previous US studies provide evidence of a negative relationship between board connections 
(Cai and Sevilir, 2012) and CEO retention (Qiu et al., 2014) with the takeover premium. Our 
results are not consistent with the US results. We do not find a significant relationship between 
takeover premiums and board connections in the UK. Roll (1986) states that bidder firm CEOs 
are likely to be overconfident and overpay for the target firm. Ex-ante board connections may 
make bidder directors subject to a familiarity bias and overconfidence, leading to 
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overestimation of synergy gains and their ability to manage the target firm. Hence, ex-ante 
board connections may not necessarily lead to a lower or higher takeover premium. 
We also find no evidence of a significant relationship between takeover premiums and board 
retention, either in terms of retention of CEOs or other directors in the UK. Bargeron et al. 
(2010) employ data from 1994-2006 and find that CEO retention is not associated with lower 
takeover premiums in the US. They argue that the decision to retain target CEOs is mainly 
based on managerial skill rather than willingness accept a lower takeover premium.  
One concern with regard to M&A in this context is that target directors may explicitly exploit 
their position to influence the takeover premium. In an extreme case, agency costs could be 
introduced by target executives which are then exploited by the bidder. If intentional, such a 
“long con” would be at best unethical and possibly illegal. However, more realistically, smaller 
scale agency costs could be introduced by poor decision-making, intentionally or otherwise, 
with a similar effect. The market for corporate control mechanism would fail to protect target 
company shareholders from agency costs in such cases and the behaviour of connected target 
directors who exploit their inside information in takeovers could reasonably be considered as 
morally arguable. However, our results indicate no such result with respect to the takeover 
premium, which is consistent with target directors bargaining appropriately, at least on the 
surface, on behalf of shareholders in the takeover process. This may also point to the limited 
influence of individual directors and CEO/director retention being motivated by retaining 
talented managers rather than reduction of the takeover premium (Fich et al., 2014). 
However, when we dig deeper, we do uncover evidence of agency costs for target shareholders. 
Whilst we do not find explicit costs in terms of the takeover premium, we are able to identify 
that offer price adjustments are lower if bidders have ex-ante connections with the target firm 
or any target firm director is retained. The offer price adjustment will be 1.49% (£14.26m) 
lower if target firms and bidder firms have shared directors; and 1.55% (£14.83m) lower if 
target firm CEOs are retained on combined boards. This evidence implies that director retention 
is used as an incentive by acquirers to encourage target directors to bargain less vigorously on 
behalf of their shareholders. In addition, we find that the proportion of the deal value paid in 
cash is negatively related with ex-ante board connections and target director retention, echoing 
findings of previous studies (e.g. Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Qiu et al., 2014). 
In addition to testing the impact of board connections and director retention on pay 
characteristics separately, to assess the joint effect we conduct a scenario analysis based on 
different combinations of connection and retention variables. Our results indicate that the best 
protection of the interests of target company shareholders is provided when there are no ex-
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ante board connections and no directors of the target company are retained after the takeover.  
In such a scenario, acquirer firms are willing to pay a higher proportion of the bid in cash, and 
perhaps more importantly, the increase in the offer price during the bid process is greater. It is 
also notable that in what might be considered the efficiency scenario, i.e. no ex-ante connection 
but a director is retained, we observe large negative and significant coefficients for the offer 
price adjustment and the cash percentage indicating suboptimal outcomes for target 
shareholders in this scenario as well. This evidence of Table 7 provides support for the view 
that target firm directors are more likely to bargain aggressively on behalf of shareholders if 
negotiation is conducted at arms-length i.e. they have no connection with the bidder and they 
do not stay on the board after takeover is completed.  
Our final empirical observation is that a positive relationship exists between the probability of 
target director (or CEO) retention on boards and ex-ante board connections. Target directors 
with ex-ante board connections are more likely to be retained on the board after the takeover 
is completed. Furthermore, target CEOs are more likely to be retained on the combined board 
if they have an ex-ante board connection with the CEO of the bidder. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
We examine the conflict of interest which arises from board connections and director retention 
between bidder and target companies in mergers and acquisitions and find a material impact 
on the wealth of target company shareholders. If target firm directors have ex-ante board 
connections with acquirer firms or they are retained on the board by the acquirer, we observe 
that the adjustment to the offer price in the bid process and the proportion of the deal value 
paid in cash are lower. In such circumstances, acquirer firm shareholders may benefit at the 
cost of target firm shareholders. Our analysis of ex-ante connection and retention scenarios 
demonstrates that target shareholders will benefit most if target directors have no connection 
with bidders and are not retained after takeover is completed.  
The evidence presented here suggests that legislation may be appropriate to enhance the 
operation of the market for corporate control. From a legal point of view, the specific conflict 
of interest is sufficiently recurrent and detrimental to the minority shareholders of the target 
company in cases of a change of control that it may warrant an amendment to legal frameworks 
existing within the UK and elsewhere. To account for the issue at hand, we suggest that a more 
detailed set of information on ex-ante board connections and intended target board retention 
should be provided by bidders with respect to the offer. 
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TABLE 1.  
Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Board Connection Variables (Independent variables) 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Ex-ante board 
connections 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bidder and target firm 
have at least one director who has worked on the same board prior to the 
takeover.  
BoardEx 
Number of ex-ante 
connection 
Number of directors have ex-ante connection. BoardEx 
Target & bidder 
CEOs ex-ante 
connections 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the CEOs of the bidder 
and target firm have served on the same board prior to the takeover. 
 
BoardEx 
Shared directors Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bidder and target firm 
share at least one director (a director works on both the boards of bidder 
and target firms) when the takeover is announced. 
BoardEx 
Proportion of shared 
directors 
The number of shared directors between bidder and target firm scaled by 
the total number of directors on the board of the bidding firm when the 
takeover is announced. 
BoardEx 
Target director 
retention 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if at least one target firm 
director retained on the board of the acquirer after takeover is completed. 
BoardEx 
Target CEO 
retention  
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the target firm CEO is 
retained on the board of the bidder after takeover is completed. 
BoardEx 
Number of target 
directors retained 
Number of target firm directors retained on the board of the bidder after 
the takeover is completed. 
BoardEx 
Proportion of target 
directors retained 
 
Number of target firm directors retained on the board of the bidder after 
the takeover is completed, scaled by total number of directors on the 
board of the target firm. 
BoardEx 
Connected and 
retained 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the value of both variables 
of “Ex-ante board connections” and “Target director retention” are one.  
BoardEx 
Connected and not 
retained  
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the value of variables of 
“Ex-ante board connections” is one and “Target director retention” is 
zero. 
BoardEx 
Not connected and 
retained  
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the value of variables of 
“Ex-ante board connections” is zero and “Target director retention” is 
one. 
BoardEx 
 
Panel B: M&A transaction variables (Dependent variables) 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Takeover Premium The price premium (%) of takeover offer price compared with target 
firm share price 4 weeks before the announcement. 
Thomson 
One Banker  
Offer price 
adjustment  
The percentage change of final takeover offer price compared with 
initial offer price. 
Thomson 
One Banker 
Cash Percentage The percentage of the deal value paid in cash of takeover deal. Thomson 
One Banker 
 
Panel C: M&A deal characteristic variables 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Friendly Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the attitude of takeover 
is friendly. 
Thomson 
One Banker  
Tender Offer Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the bid is tender offer. Thomson 
One Banker 
Same Industry  Dummy variable which takes a value of one if acquirer and target firm 
share the same 2-digit SIC code. 
Thomson 
One Banker 
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Prior M&A 
Ownership 
Percentage of target firm’s share owned by acquirer prior to M&A.  Thomson 
One Banker 
   
TABLE 1. (Continued) 
Panel D: Firm characteristic variables 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Target Size The natural logarithm of market value of equity of target firm in £m 
four weeks prior to the deal announcement. 
Thomson 
One Banker  
Target MTB (Target firm’s total assets – book value of common equity + market 
value of common equity), scaled by total assets; measured at the end 
of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement date. 
DataStream 
Target Leverage  Target firm’s long-term debt scaled by total assets; measured at the 
end of the last fiscal year prior to the deal announcement date. 
DataStream 
Target Profitability  Target firm’s earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets; measured at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal 
announcement date. 
DataStream 
Acquirer Size The natural logarithm of market value of equity of acquirer firm in £m 
four weeks prior to the deal announcement. 
Thomson 
One Banker  
Acquirer MTB (Acquirer firm’s total assets – book value of common equity + market 
value of common equity), scaled by total assets; measured at the end 
of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement date. 
DataStream 
Acquirer Leverage  Acquirer firm’s long-term debt scaled by total assets; measured at the 
end of the last fiscal year before the deal announcement date. 
DataStream 
Acquirer 
Profitability  
Acquirer firm’s earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets; measured at the end of the last fiscal year before the deal 
announcement date. 
DataStream 
 
Panel E: Corporate governance variables  
Variable Name Definition Source 
Acquirer CEO 
duality  
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if acquirer CEO is also the 
chairman or chairwoman. 
BoardEx 
Acquirer board 
independent  
The number of independent directors (NED) scaled by total number of 
directors on the board of the acquirer firm. 
 
BoardEx 
Acquirer CEO 
tenure 
The log of acquirer CEO tenure in years.  BoardEx 
Founder acquirer 
CEO 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if acquirer CEO is also the 
founder of the firm.  
BoardEx 
Acquirer CEO 
equity incentives  
The estimated value of shares, stock options and restricted shares held 
by the acquirer CEO, scaled by the market value of the acquirer firm. 
BoardEx 
DataStream 
Target CEO age  Target CEO age when takeover deal is announced. BoardEx 
Target CEO equity 
incentives 
The estimated value of shares, stock options and restricted shares held 
by the target CEO, scaled by the market value of the target firm. 
BoardEx 
DataStream 
Target CEO duality Dummy variable which takes a value of one if target CEO is also the 
chairman or chairwoman. 
BoardEx 
Target board 
independent 
The number of independent directors (NED) scaled by total number of 
directors on the board of the target firm. 
BoardEx 
Target CEO tenure The log of target CEO tenure in years. BoardEx 
Founder target CEO Dummy variable which takes a value of one if target CEO is also the 
founder of the firm. 
BoardEx 
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TABLE 2. 
Descriptive Statistics   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 
to 2015. All variables are defined in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
Variables Mean Min Med Max Std. 
Ex-ante board connections (dummy) 0.15 0 0 1 0.36 
Number of ex-ante connection 0.25 0 0 4 0.86 
Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante connections 
(dummy) 
0.09 0 0 1 0.29 
Shared directors (dummy) 0.10 0 0 1 0.29 
Proportion of shared directors (%) 2.00 0 0 33.33 6.67 
Target director retention (dummy) 0.34 0 0 1 0.48 
Target CEO retention (dummy) 0.23 0 0 1 0.42 
Number of target directors retained (N) 0.42 0 0 4 0.79 
Proportion of target directors retained (%) 6.85 0 0 50.00 12.81 
Takeover premium (%) 31.80 -91.37 27.91 248.00 43.34 
Offer price adjustment (%) 0.97 -2.16 0 25.20 4.21 
Cash percentage (%) 48.48 0 48.62 100 44.45 
Friendly  (dummy) 0.96 0 1 1 0.20 
Tender offer (dummy) 0.78 0 1 1 0.42 
Same Industry (dummy) 0.56 0 1 1 0.50 
Prior M&A Ownership (%) 1.54 0 0 47.06 6.09 
Target Size (£M) 725.38 1.20 47.19 44145.30 3940.50 
Target Leverage (%) 12.43 0 5.46 72.48 16.04 
Target MTB (ratio) 1.60 0.42 1.29 5.90 0.98 
Target Profitability (%) -5.04 -155.38 1.74 25.40 24.97 
Acquirer Size (£M) 2763.93 1.86 341.05 92366.75 10484.30 
Acquirer Leverage (%) 14.35 0 9.07 65.25 16.27 
Acquirer MTB (ratio) 1.93 0.65 1.53 7.56 1.28 
Acquirer Profitability (%) 1.09 -95.30 3.87 26.45 15.99 
Acquirer CEO & Chairman duality (dummy) 0.11 0 0 1 0.31 
Acquirer independent director ratio (%) 54.50 0 56.56 81.25 13.92 
Acquirer CEO equity incentives (%) 2.46 0 0.57 23.72 4.45 
Target CEO age 50.32 32.95 50.32 70.71 7.65 
Target CEO equity incentives (%) 3.43 0 0.31 38.29 7.78 
 
TABLE 3. 
Univariate Analysis for Retained target CEO pay before and after M&A 
Table 3 presents the mean compensation for retained target CEOs as executive directors (CEO or non-CEO 
executive director) after M&A is completed. There are 37 cases of target CEOs retained as executive directors 
after M&A is completed out of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions cases from 1999 to 2015. Statistical 
significance of differences between means is tested using an independent samples t-test. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Pay component Before M&A (1) After M&A (2) (2)-(1) 
Salary  £99,000 £295,000 £196,000*** 
Variable pay (bonus + equity grant) £68,000 £250,000 £182,000*** 
Total pay (Salary + Variable pay) £167,000 £545,000 £378,000*** 
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TABLE 4. 
Board connections, retention and takeover premiumsvii 
Table 4 presents OLS regressions for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the takeover premium. Independent variables in Panel A are board connection 
variables when the takeover is announced. Independent variables in Panel B are a set of board retention variables 
after the takeover is completed. All other variables are defined as in Table 1. Fixed effects are included for year 
and industry (Fama-French 12 industry classifications) but are not reported for brevity. White heteroscedasticity-
corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Board connections when takeover is announced: Dependent = Takeover premium (%) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ex-ante board connections 6.90 9.77       
 (0.82) (1.12)       
Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante connections   5.13 8.29     
   (0.36) (0.58)     
Shared directors     9.06 11.20   
     (0.69) (0.84)   
Proportion of shared directors        0.86 0.90 
       (1.05) (1.10) 
Ownership prior to M&A  -0.79*  -0.74  -0.73*  -0.72* 
  (-1.88)  (-1.64)  (-1.71)  (-1.74) 
Friendly 3.92 5.46 3.76 5.09 3.71 5.08 3.41 4.78 
 (0.37) (0.50) (0.36) (0.47) (0.36) (0.48) (0.34) (0.46) 
Tender offer  14.93* 13.65* 14.99* 13.87* 15.15* 13.99* 15.58* 14.37* 
 (1.92) (1.77) (1.90) (1.77) (1.91) (1.78) (1.94) (1.80) 
Same industry 6.95 6.47 7.18 6.94 7.38 7.1 8.33 7.89 
 (1.03) (0.97) (1.03) (1.00) (1.04) (1.0) (1.15) (1.10) 
Target size -7.99** -8.33** -7.8*** -8.03** -8.18** -8.51** -8.61** -8.9*** 
 (-2.38) (-2.47) (-2.27) (-2.35) (-2.46) (-2.54) (-2.69) (-2.76) 
Target MTB -4.25 -4.53 -4.04 -4.17 -4.27 -4.53 -4.27 -4.52 
 (-1.29) (-1.37) (-1.27) (-1.32) (-1.29) (-1.36) (-1.32) (-1.40) 
Target leverage -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 
 (-0.23) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.37) (-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.15) (-0.24) 
Target profitability 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.43) (0.44) (0.54) (0.56) (0.76) (0.77) 
Acquirer size 7.9*** 8.1*** 7.9*** 8.1*** 8.2*** 8.4*** 8.8*** 8.9*** 
 (3.74) (3.73) (3.73) (3.71) (3.82) (3.79) (3.96) (3.91) 
Acquirer MTB 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.35 2.34 2.26 2.26 
 (0.87) (0.88) (0.87) (0.88) (0.84) (0.85) (0.81) (0.82) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 
 (-0.01) (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.17) (-0.26) (-0.32) 
Acquirer profitability -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
 (-0.24) (-0.13) (-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.24) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.25) 
Constant -8.47 -8.81 -9.86 -11.35 -10.13 -10.60 -8.47 -13.73 
 (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.31) (-0.47) 
Year & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
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TABLE 4. (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Board retention after takeover is completed: Dependent = Takeover premium (%) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target director retention 6.50 6.54       
 (0.75) (0.77)       
Target CEO retention   1.26 1.83     
   (0.18) (0.27)     
Number of target directors retained     2.78 2.79   
     (0.94) (0.95)   
Proportion of target directors retained       0.11 0.12 
       (0.63) (0.68) 
Ownership prior to M&A  -0.66  -1.66  -0.66  -0.67 
  (-1.45)  (-0.48)  (-1.42)  (-1.45) 
Friendly 2.52 3.78 3.83 5.08 2.42 3.68 2.65 3.87 
 (0.23) (0.34) (0.36) (0.47) (0.21) (0.32) (0.24) (0.35) 
Tender offer  15.83* 14.69* 14.89* 13.81* 17.58* 16.45* 16.41* 15.34* 
 (1.92) (1.79) (1.87) (1.75) (1.91) (1.79) (1.85) (1.73) 
Same industry 6.56 6.07 6.71 6.23 6.34 5.85 6.62 6.12 
 (0.99) (0.93) (1.00) (0.95) (0.96) (0.89) (1.00) (0.93) 
Target size -8.45** -8.66** -7.83** -8.1** -8.9** -9.1*** -8.18** -8.41** 
 (-2.54) (-2.60) (-2.17) (-2.23) (-2.71) (-2.77) (-2.47) (-2.53) 
Target MTB -4.38 -4.61 -4.26 -4.51 -4.60 -4.83 -4.38 -4.62 
 (-1.30) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-1.35) (-1.33) (-1.40) (-1.29) (-1.36) 
Target leverage -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 
 (-0.24) (-0.32) (-0.26) (-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.36) 
Target profitability 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.41) (0.40) (0.31) (0.30) 
Acquirer size 8.7*** 8.8*** 8.0*** 8.0*** 9.0*** 9.05*** 8.5*** 8.64*** 
 (4.05) (4.01) (3.45) (3.44) (4.08) (4.04) (3.94) (3.93) 
Acquirer MTB 2.19 2.19 2.45 2.47 2.15 2.16 2.30 2.30 
 (0.79) (0.80) (0.88) (0.90) (0.78) (0.79) (0.84) (0.85) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.01) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.04) 
Acquirer profitability -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 (-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.22) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.06) 
Constant -12.26 -12.06 -7.84 -7.96 -14.46 -14.26 -12.21 -12.25 
 (-0.43) (-0.42) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.48) (-0.70) (-0.42) (-0.41) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
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TABLE 5. 
Board connections, retention and offer price adjustment 
Table 5 presents OLS regressions for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the percentage change in the offer price adjustment compared with initial offer 
price. Independent variables in Panel A are board connection variables when the takeover is announced. 
Independent variables in Panel B are a set of board retention variables after the takeover is completed. All variables 
are as defined as in Table 1. Fixed effects are included for year and industry (Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications) but are not reported for brevity. White heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Board connections when takeover is announced: Dependant = Offer price adjustment (%) 
 
                                                                  Dependent Variable: Offer price adjustment (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ex-ante board connections -0.31 -0.22       
 (-0.43) (-0.30)       
Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante connections   -1.3** -1.20**     
   (-2.07) (-2.04)     
Shared directors     -1.49** -1.44**   
     (-2.24) (-2.23)   
Proportion of shared directors       -0.06** -0.06** 
       (-2.04) (-2.04) 
Ownership prior to M&A  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
  (-0.77)  (-0.55)  (-0.62)  (-0.07) 
Friendly -7.47** -7.42** -7.4** -7.40** -7.44** -7.40** -7.43** -7.39** 
 (-2.28) (-2.26) (-2.29) (-2.27) (-2.29) (-2.20) (-2.29) (-2.27) 
Tender offer  -0.39 -0.43 -0.45 -0.47 -0.46 -0.48 -0.45 -0.49 
 (-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.58) 
Same industry -1.34** -1.36** -1.5** -1.46** -1.45** -1.46** -1.5** -1.5** 
 (-2.25) (-2.25) (-2.33) (-2.33) (-2.34) (-2.33) (-2.32) (-2.32) 
Target size 0.50* 0.49 0.49* 0.49* 0.56* 0.55* 0.55* 0.54* 
 (1.67) (1.64) (1.73) (1.71) (1.82) (1.80) (1.80) (1.78) 
Target MTB -0.12 -0.13 -0.17 -0.18 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
 (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.77) (-0.79) (-0.52) (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.58) 
Target leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.73) (-0.76) (-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-0.86) 
Target profitability -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.97) (-0.96) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.21) (-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.21) 
Acquirer size -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.22 -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 
 (-1.01) (-0.99) (-1.13) (-1.19) (-1.25) (-1.23) (-1.25) (-1.24) 
Acquirer MTB -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.33) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.68) (0.67) (0.71) (0.70) 
Acquirer profitability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.30) (0.33) (0.42) (0.44) (0.29) (0.31) (0.38) (0.41) 
Constant 3.91 3.90 4.55 4.52 4.36 4.35 4.33 4.32 
 (0.98) (0.97) (1.12) (1.11) (1.08) (1.07) (1.07) (1.07) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 
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TABLE 5. (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Board retention after takeover is completed: Dependant = Offer price adjustment (%) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
 Target director retention -1.55** -1.54**       
 (-2.11) (-2.11)       
 Target CEO retention   -1.55** -1.54**     
   (-2.26) (-2.23)    
 Number of target directors retained     -0.45** -0.45**   
     (-2.43) (-2.42)  
 Proportion of target directors retained       -0.02** -0.02** 
        (-2.06) (-2.03) 
 Ownership prior to M&A  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
   (-0.86)  (-0.70)  (-0.86)  (-0.78) 
 Friendly -7.14** -7.09** -7.38** -7.34** -7.22** -7.17** -7.19** -7.15** 
 (-2.24) (-2.21) (-2.32) (-2.29) (-2.28) (-2.26) (-2.25) (-2.23) 
 Tender offer -0.65 -0.69 -0.58 -0.68 -0.85 -0.90 -0.75 -0.79 
 (-0.78) (-0.81) (-0.70) (-0.73) (-0.96) (-0.99) (-0.86) (-0.89) 
 Same industry -1.30** -1.32** -1.36** -1.38** -1.28** -1.30** -1.32** -1.34** 
 (-2.24) (-2.25) (-2.29) (-2.30) (-2.19) (-2.20) (-2.24) (-2.24) 
 Target size 0.65** 0.64** 0.60** 0.59* 0.68** 0.67** 0.58** 0.57* 
 (2.01) (2.00) (1.99) (1.97) (2.20) (2.18) (1.98) (1.96) 
 Target MTB -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 
 (-0.39) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.43) (-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.40) (-0.45) 
 Target leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.83) (-0.86) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.67) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.74) 
 Target profitability -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.66) (-0.53) (-1.02) (-1.03) (-0.74) (-0.74) 
 Acquirer size -0.41 -0.40 -0.34 -0.34 -0.39* -0.39* -0.36 -0.36 
 (-1.56) (-1.55) (-1.47) (-1.45) (-1.70) (-1.69) (-1.54) (-1.53) 
 Acquirer MTB -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
 (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.24) (-0.24) 
 Acquirer Leverage 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.56) (0.55) (0.65) (0.65) (0.60) (0.59) (0.52) (0.52) 
 Acquirer profitability 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.01) (0.05) (0.36) (0.40) (0.07) (0.11) 
 Constant 5.10 5.11 4.85 4.85 5.06 5.07 4.99 4.99 
 (1.25) (1.25) (1.19) (1.19) (1.25) (1.24) (1.21) (1.20) 
 Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Adjusted R2 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.07 
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TABLE 6. 
Board connections, retention and cash payment 
Table 6 presents OLS regressions for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 
2015. The dependent variable is the percentage of the deal value paid in cash. Independent variables in Panel A 
are board connection variables when the takeover is announced. Independent variables in Panel B are a set of 
board retention variables after the takeover is completed. All variables are as defined as in Table 1. Fixed effects 
are included for year and industry (Fama-French 12 industry classifications) but are not reported for brevity. White 
heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Board connections when takeover is announced: Dependent= Cash percentage (%) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ex-ante board connections -19.0*** -17.37**       
 (-2.70) (-2.32)       
Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante connections   -29*** -27***     
   (-3.11) (-2.86)     
Shared directors     -27*** -26***   
     (-3.21) (-3.06)   
Proportion of shared directors        -0.99** -0.95** 
       (-2.57) (-2.52) 
Ownership prior to M&A  -0.46  -0.44  -0.52  -0.62 
  (-0.86)  (-0.93)  (-1.10)  (-1.25) 
Friendly -3.13 -2.24 -2.28 -1.48 -2.50 -1.53 -2.50 -1.32 
 (-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.09) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.15) (-0.08) 
Tender offer  18.1** 17.33** 17.2** 16.51** 17.4** 16.53** 18** 17** 
 (2.49) (2.39) (2.43) (2.32) (2.45) (2.34) (2.47) (2.34) 
Same industry -2.84 -3.02 -4.89 -5.03 -4.21 -4.48 -4.03 -4.41 
 (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.84) (-0.86) (-0.71) (-0.76) (-0.67) (-0.74) 
Target size -13*** -13*** -13*** -14*** -12*** -13*** -13*** -13*** 
 (-7.54) (-7.59) (-7.70) (-7.75) (-6.97) (-7.07) (-7.15) (-7.26) 
Target MTB -1.21 -1.37 -2.36 -2.44 -1.13 -1.32 -1.19 -1.41 
 (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.83) (-0.86) (-0.39) (-0.46) (-0.42) (-0.49) 
Target leverage -0.12 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.14 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 
 (-0.65) (-0.73) (-0.31) (-0.42) (-0.73) (-0.83) (-0.65) (-0.78) 
Target profitability 0.3*** 0.33*** 0.3*** 0.33*** 0.3*** 0.30*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 
 (3.38) (3.39) (3.40) (3.41) (3.03) (3.06) (3.05) (3.06) 
Acquirer size 12*** 12*** 12*** 12*** 11*** 11*** 11*** 11*** 
 (7.61) (7.45) (7.43) (7.33) (6.96) (6.86) (6.77) (6.69) 
Acquirer MTB -2.69 -2.69 -2.63 -2.64 -2.51 -2.52 -2.55 -2.55 
 (-1.23) (-1.22) (-1.17) (-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.15) (-1.15) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.45) (0.41) (0.48) (0.44) 
Acquirer profitability 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.30 
 (1.11) (1.15) (1.27) (1.29) (1.10) (1.15) (1.18) (1.23) 
Constant -0.50 -0.69 11.46 10.57 4.76 4.43 3.11 3.01 
 (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.35) (0.32) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29 
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TABLE 6. (Continued) 
Panel B: Board retention after takeover is completed: Dependent = Cash percentage (%) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Target director retention -17.2** -17.2**       
 (-2.14) (-2.14)       
Target CEO retention   -13.10* -12.54     
   (-1.65) (-1.59)     
Number of target directors retained     -7*** -7***   
     (-3.87) (-3.86)   
Proportion of target directors retained       -0.4*** -0.4*** 
       (-3.15) (-3.10) 
Ownership prior to M&A  -0.69  -0.65  -0.69  -0.65 
  (-1.42)  (-1.28)  (-1.37)  (-1.29) 
Friendly 0.59 1.91 -2.37 -1.14 0.54 1.86 1.17 2.90 
 (0.03) (0.10) (-0.13) (-0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) 
Tender offer  15.7** 15.55* 16.99** 15.9** 11.69 10.51 12.23 11.19 
 (2.14) (1.97) (2.26) (2.21) (1.57) (0.38) (1.64) (1.47) 
Same industry -1.79 -2.30 -2.34 -2.82 -1.27 -1.78 -1.85 -2.34 
 (-0.31) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.48) (-0.23) (-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.41) 
Target size -12*** -12*** -13*** -13*** -11*** -11*** -12 *** -12*** 
 (-5.97) (-6.10) (-6.77) (-6.92) (-5.49) (-5.61) (-6.53) (-6.62) 
Target MTB -0.86 -1.10 -0.94 -1.18 -0.35 -0.59 -0.69 -0.92 
 (-0.31) (-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.42) (-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.26) (-0.35) 
Target leverage -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 
 (-0.55) (-0.70) (-0.60) (-0.73) (-0.29) (-0.45) (-0.36) (-0.51) 
Target profitability 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 
 (3.59) (3.57) (3.86) (3.84) (3.63) (3.62) (3.91) (3.90) 
Acquirer size 10*** 10*** 11*** 11** 9*** 9*** 10*** 10*** 
 (5.00) (4.95) (6.16) (6.20) (5.39) (5.34) (5.14) (5.09) 
Acquirer MTB -2.10 -2.10 -2.96 -2.94 -2.06 -2.05 -2.23 -2.23 
 (-1.03) (-1.02) (-1.32) (-1.31) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 
 (0.22) (0.18) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.25) (0.13) (0.09) 
Acquirer profitability 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.23 
 (0.99) (1.06) (0.96) (1.02) (1.15) (1.21) (0.81) (0.87) 
Constant 9.33 9.54 3.90 3.78 13.57 13.79 15.29 15.25 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.11) 0.11) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.31 
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TABLE 7. M&A pay characteristics, board connections and director retention 
Table 7 presents OLS regressions for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 
2015. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (3) are takeover premiums, offer price adjustment and cash 
percentage respectively. All variables are defined as in Table 1. Fixed effects are included for year and industry 
(Fama-French 12 industry classifications) but are not reported for brevity. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Takeover premium 
 (%) 
Offer price adjustment 
 (%) 
Cash percentage 
 (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connected and retained 15.58 -1.62* -30.03*** 
 (0.76) (-1.75) (-2.80) 
Connected and not retained 8.47 -0.04 -17.57* 
 (1.03) (-0.04) (-1.67) 
Not connected and retained 5.44 -1.53* -16.69* 
 (0.74) (-1.87) (-1.92) 
Ownership prior to M&A -0.78* -0.02 -0.47 
 (-1.82) (-0.78) (-0.92) 
Friendly 4.19 -7.09** 1.11 
 (0.37) (-2.21) (0.06) 
Tender offer 14.57* -0.69 14.45* 
 (1.79) (-0.81) (1.97) 
Same industry 6.36 -1.33** -2.73 
 (0.94) (-2.23) (-0.47) 
Target size -8.93*** 0.65* -11.47*** 
 (2.69) (1.94) (5.94) 
Target MTB -4.68 -0.10 -1.11 
 (-1.33) (-0.43) (-0.40) 
Target leverage -0.10 -0.02 -0.16 
 (-0.28) (-0.85) (-0.84) 
Target profitability 0.08 -0.01 0.33*** 
 (0.51) (-0.97) (3.43) 
Acquirer size 8.81*** -0.40 9.84*** 
 (4.04) (-1.51) (4.92) 
Acquirer MTB 2.19 -0.02 -2.10 
 (0.79) (-0.09) (-1.02) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.01 0.01 0.03 
 (-0.06) (0.55) (0.15) 
Acquirer profitability -0.01 0.01 0.25 
 (-0.07) (0.16) (1.07) 
Constant -12.63 5.09 13.56 
 (-0.46) (1.26) (0.37) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.30 
    
Wald Test 
(coefficients restriction) 
Difference between 
coefficients 
( t stat) 
Difference between 
coefficients 
( t stat) 
Difference between 
coefficients 
( t stat) 
Null : Coefficient of  
Connected and retained =  
Coefficient of 
Connected and not retained 
7.11 
(0.03) 
-1.58 
(-0.87) 
-12.46 
(-0.98) 
    
Null : Coefficient of  
Connected and retained =  
Coefficient of 
Not connected and retained 
10.14 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(-0.14) 
-13.34 
(-1.36) 
    
Null : Coefficient of  
Connected and not retained =  
Coefficient of 
Not connected and retained 
3.03 
(0.26) 
1.49 
(0.22) 
-0.88 
(-0.08) 
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TABLE 8. 
Board connections and the probability of board retention  
Table 8 presents probit regressions for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 
2015. The dependent variables are dummy variables which take a value of one if a target director or the CEO 
remains on the combined board after the takeover is completed. All variables are as defined as in Table 1. Fixed 
effects are included for year and target industry (Fama-French 12 industry classifications) but are not reported for 
brevity. Clustered robust standard errors are estimated using acquirer industry. Z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Any 
target director 
retention 
Only 
Non-CEO target 
director retention 
Target CEO retention 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ex-ante board connections 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.04 0.03    
 (3.12) (3.09) (0.12) (0.09)    
Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante 
 
    0.97** 1.01** 0.97** 
     (2.22) (2.25) (2.1) 
Friendly 0.48 0.43   0.23 0.14 0.14 
 (0.75) (0.71)   (0.33) (0.20) (0.21) 
Tender offer -0.60** -0.63** -0.30 -0.29 -0.57* -0.57* -0.63** 
 (-2.01) (-2.02) (-0.87) (-0.9) (-1.9) (-1.93) (-2.29) 
Same industry 0.14 0.09 0.43 0.42 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.48) (0.29) (1.22) (1.20) (0.02) (-0.13) (-0.14) 
Target size 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (2.44) (2.42) (1.09) (1.04) (3.38) (3.29) (3.52) 
Target MTB 0.09 0.10 -0.15 -0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 
 (0.60) (0.61) (-0.65) (-0.63) (1.25) (1.27) (1.16) 
Target Leverage 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.26) (0.80) (0.80) (-1.84) (-1.80) (-1.29) 
Target probability 0.00 0.01 -0.01** -0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.94) (1.02) (-2.19) (-2.30) (2.38) (2.36) (2.43) 
Acquirer size -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (-2.71) (-2.54) (-1.39) (-1.12) (-3.92) (-3.76) (-3.89) 
Acquirer MTB 0.09 0.07 0.29*** 0.29*** -0.23** -0.23** -0.24** 
 (0.87) (0.64) (2.89) (2.79) (-2.13) (-2.22) (-2.11) 
Acquirer leverage -0.01* -0.01 -0.03** -0.03** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.69) (-1.53) (-2.56) (-2.52) (0.04) (0.12) (0.02) 
Acquirer profitability -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (-1.40) (-1.53) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-2.76) (-2.76) (-3.12) 
Acquirer CEO & Chairman duality  0.01  -0.05  0.14 0.15 
  (0.02)  (-0.16)  (0.73) (0.63) 
Acquirer independent director ratio  -0.02**  0.00  -0.02* -0.02* 
  (-2.36)  (-0.75)  (-1.95) (-1.85) 
Acquirer CEO equity incentives  -0.01  0.00  -0.03 -0.03 
  (-0.53)  (-0.09)  (-1.33) (-1.21) 
Target CEO age (log)       0.01 
       (0.32) 
Target CEO equity incentives       0.03 
       (1.04) 
Constant -0.39 1.03 -2.70*** -2.42*** -4.48*** -3.40*** -4.29*** 
 (-0.53) (1.05) (-3.98) (-2.65) (-4.34) (-2.63) (-2.97) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.33 0.30 
 
0.30 0.33 0.35 0.36 
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TABLE 9. 
Board connections and proportion of board retained  
Table 9 presents OLS regressions for the sample of 209 completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 
2015. The dependent variable is proportion of target firm director retention (%). All variables are defined as in 
Table 1. Fixed effects are included for year and industry (Fama-French 12 industry classifications) but are not 
reported for brevity. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion of shared directors -0.22 -0.05   
 (-0.88) (-0.06)   
Proportion of shared directors ^  -0.01   
  (-0.20)   
Number of ex-ante connections   -1.04 0.42 
   (-0.62) (0.11) 
Number of ex-ante connections ^    -0.24 
    (-0.61) 
Friendly 10.08 10.08 9.97 9.98 
 (0.14) (1.47) (1.45) (1.43) 
Tender offer -15.20*** -15.22*** -15.27*** -15.43 
 (-3.21) (-3.21) (-3.16) (-3.21) 
Same industry -0.38 -0.38 -0.16 -0.14 
 (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.05) (-0.04) 
Target Size 4.01*** 4.00*** 3.89*** 3.85*** 
 (3.21) (3.19) (3.13) (3.08) 
Target MTB 1.28 1.26 1.26 1.24 
 (0.74) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71) 
Target leverage 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
Target probability 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
 (1.12) (1.11) (1.21) (1.24) 
Acquirer size -6.58*** -6.60*** -6.38*** -6.33*** 
 (-5.58) (-5.57) (-5.52) (-5.38) 
Acquirer MTB 1.06 1.05 0.99 0.99 
 (1.00) (0.98) (0.93) (0.92) 
Acquirer leverage -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.48) (-0.52) 
Acquirer profitability -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 
 (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.98) (-0.98) 
Acquirer CEO & Chairman duality 0.25 0.25 0.36 0.33 
 (0.04) (0.04) 90.06) (0.06) 
Acquirer independent director ratio -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
 (-1.21) (-1.23) (-1.22) (-1.22) 
Acquirer CEO equity incentives -0.50 -0.51 -0.50 -0.50 
 (-1.57) (-1.58) (-1.57) (-1.55) 
Constant 62.35*** 62.40*** 61.97*** 61.43*** 
 3.56 (3.54) (3.51) (3.43) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
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TABLE 10. 
Heckman correction model 
Table 10 presents the results of Heckman (1979) two stages correction procedure. The sample consists of 209 
completed UK mergers and acquisitions from 1999 to 2015. Column (1) presents the first stage of Heckman 
(1979) procedure, a probit model where dependent variable is Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante connection. 
Columns (2) and (3) present the second stage of Heckman (1979) procedure, where dependent variables are offer 
price adjustment and cash percentage respectively. Lambda is the coefficient of inverse Mills ratio calculating 
from column (1). White heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable:                                                            Target & Acquirer CEOs     Offer price adjustment (%)   Cash percentage (%) 
                                                                                             ex-ante board connections     
 (1) (2) (3) 
Target & Acquirer CEOs ex-ante connections  -1.19** -29.96*** 
  (-2.58) (-3.43) 
Same city 0.84***   
 (2.63)   
Lambda  -0.02 1.46 
  (-0.24) (0.90) 
Friendly  -7.26** 3.06 
  (-2.08) (0.19) 
Tender offer -0.12 -0.11 17.41*** 
 (-0.38) (-0.14) (2.87) 
Same industry -0.81*** -0.98* -9.33 
 (-2.78) (-1.80) (-1.46) 
Target size -0.01 0.37 -13.20*** 
 (-0.11) (1.51) (-7.96) 
Target MTB -0.43** -0.26 -6.66** 
 (-2.01) (-0.90) (-2.36) 
Target Leverage 0.01 -0.01 0.05 
 (0.67) (-0.61) (0.29) 
Target profitability -0.01 -0.01 0.34*** 
 (-1.35) (-0.19) (3.19) 
Acquirer size -0.15* -0.22 10.76*** 
 (-1.78) (-1.16) (6.47) 
Acquirer MTB -0.01 0.04 -3.60* 
 (-0.09) (0.26) (-1.72) 
Acquirer leverage -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.20) (0.62) (0.07) 
Acquirer profitability 0.01 0.01 0.35 
 (1.58) (0.25) (1.57) 
Constant 0.59 9.66** 38.14 
 (1.01) (2.40) (1.49) 
Years & Industry YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 N/A 0.03 0.04 
McFaden R2 0.19 N/A N/A 
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Appendix 1 
Board connections, retention and M&A Characteristics (without “non-friendly” takeovers) 
This table is replicatesTables 4-6 in the main document. The main purpose is to eliminate the effect of “non-
friendly” takeovers. We exclude all “non-friendly” observations and exclude the variable “friendly” from the 
regression. The sample size drops from 209 to 200. 
 Takeover premium (%) Offer price adjustment (%) Cash percentage (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ex-ante board connections 9.81  -0.93**  -20.54***  
Target director retention  9.78  -1.13* -0.39 -21.59*** 
       
Ownership prior to M&A -0.83* -0.70 -0.02 -0.03 19.54 -0.67 
Tender offer 12.83 15.06* 0.09 -0.16 -3.28*** 14.65* 
Same industry 7.56 7.31 -1.01 -0.99* -13.78 -2.78 
Target size -7.59 -8.09** 0.59 0.65** -0.69*** -12.62*** 
Target MTB -4.55** -4.71 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.33 
Target leverage -0.10 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.35 -0.06 
Target profitability 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.00 12.44*** 0.39*** 
Acquirer size 7.52*** 8.61*** -0.24 -0.37* -3.36*** 10.01*** 
Acquirer MTB 3.25 2.99 0.01 0.04 0.08 -2.77 
Acquirer Leverage -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.07 
Acquirer profitability -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.39 0.27 
Constant -2.78 -12.25 -3.27 -2.15 0.98 22.05 
Years & Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.32 0.33 
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i There may be other pecuniary benefits associated with board connections which are unobservable in our 
sample. 
ii We also examine a control variable for ownership prior to the M&A in regressions (Tables 4-6). This variable 
is weakly significant in columns (2), (6) and (8) of Panel A in Table 4 only. This suggests that a higher level of 
ownership prior to the M&A will lead to a lower takeover premium, which is consistent with our expectation. 
However, with or without this control variable, the significance of our explanatory variables for connections 
and retention remains unchanged in Tables 4-6. 
iii In unreported tests, we employ univariate analysis to confirm that takeover premium, offer price 
adjustment and cash percentage are lower on average for the sample of retained target directors, compared 
with the sample of no directors retained. 
iv We use the takeover premium based on the stock price four weeks prior to the initial bid as the dependent 
variable. Results are not materially altered when we estimate the premium using stock prices one week prior 
or one day prior to the takeover. 
v Directors holdings may also be relevant to our study. In our view, such holdings do not influence connections 
or the desire for retention but may influence the bargaining by the directors. The influence would therefore be 
detected through an opposite finding to the one we have in our study. We find a negative influence of 
retention for target shareholders which is not confounded by the endogenous nature of director retention. It 
may reasonably be argued that if directors’ holdings increase bargaining on behalf of their shareholders then 
our evidence indicates that the influence of retention would be greater than we identify. In the UK, such 
holdings would only be expected to be large for a very small number of observations in our sample and CEOs 
can be expected to have much higher holdings than other directors. For example, in Iona & Leonida (2016), the 
median value for CEO holdings is 2.68% and only 0.17% for non-CEOs. 
vi As an additional robustness check, we estimated models without cases of “friendly = 0”. The results are 
shown in Appendix 1. The total number of observations falls in this specification from 209 to 200. Results 
remain materially unchanged in these models which exclude “unfriendly” takeovers. 
vii We have three observations with extreme negative premium (-91.37%) in full sample. To check the 
robustness, we exclude those three observations and replicate regressions in Table 4. The results remain 
unchanged. There is no relation between premium and connections & retention. 
                                                          
